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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Dahlgren, VA, in June 1968 after graduating from Mississippi State University with a BSME. His early 
career was spent in ordnance design and weapons systems. He subsequently served on the planning 
team to reintroduce the Navy to Wallops Island, VA, currently a multiple ship combat, over-the-water 
weapons testing lab for Surface Ship Combat Systems, Fighter Aircraft, and live missile firings. His 
outstanding service as the deployed Science Advisor to Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet was 
recognized with the Navy’s Superior Civilian Service (NSCS) Award and the Navy Science 
Assistance Program Science Advisor of the Year Award. 
Mr. Pitts was selected to lead the technical analysis team in support of the formal JAG investigation of 
the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes, and participated in subsequent briefings to 
CENTCOM, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary of Defense. As Head, Surface Ship 
Program Office and Aegis Program Manager, Mr. Pitts was awarded a second NSCS, the James 
Colvard Award, and the John Adolphus Dahlgren Award (Dahlgren’s highest honor) for his 
achievements in the fields of science, engineering, and management. Anticipating the future course 
of combatant surface ships, Mr. Pitts co-founded the NSWCDD Advanced Computing Technology 
effort, which eventually became the Aegis/DARPA-sponsored High Performance Distributed 
Computing Program; the world’s most advanced distributed real-time computing technology effort. 
That effort was the foundation for the Navy’s current Open Architecture Initiative. 
In 2003 Mr. Pitts accepted responsibility as Technical Director for PEO Integrated Warfare Systems 
(IWS), the overall technical authority for the PEO. In September of that year, he was reassigned as 
the Major Program Manager for Integrated Combat Systems in the PEO. In this position, he was the 
Program Manager for the Combat Systems and Training Systems for all U.S. Navy Surface 
Combatants, including Aircraft Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates, Amphibious Ships, and 
auxiliaries. In July, 2006, Mr. Pitts returned to NSWCDD to form and head the Warfare Systems 
Department. While in this position, he maintained his personal technical involvement as the 
certification official for Surface Navy Combat Systems. He also served as Chair of the Combat 
System Configuration Control Board and Chair of the Mission Readiness Review for Operation Burnt 
Frost, the killing of inoperative satellite USA 193. 
Mr. Pitts has been a guest speaker/lecturer/symposium panelist at many NAVSEA-level and DoD 
symposiums, conferences and at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Systems Management 
College, and the National Defense University. For 19 years Mr. Pitts was the sole certification 
authority of all Aegis Combat System computer programs for fleet use. He retired from the U.S. Civil 
Service in September 2008, with over 40 years of service to the Navy.
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Brigadier General Michael E. Williamson, US Army—Joint Program Executive Officer for the Joint 
Tactical Radio System.  
General Williamson was born in Tucson, Arizona. He was commissioned at the University of Maine 
as a Second Lieutenant in the Air Defense Artillery in 1983. His assignments include service as the 
Automation Officer for the 32nd AADCOM in Darmstadt Germany. He then served as a Chaparral 
Platoon Leader, Vulcan Platoon Leader, Maintenance Officer and Executive Officer in C Battery, 
108th Brigade, Hahn Air Force Base, Germany. After attending the Air Defense Artillery Advance 
Course, he served as the Chief, Forward Area Air Defense Weapons, Development Branch at Fort 
Bliss, Texas. He then commanded B Battery, 3/1 ADA (Hawk) in the 11th Brigade at Fort Bliss and 
also in the 31st ADA Brigade at Fort Hood, Texas. After completing command, he served as the 
Assistant S-3 in the 31st ADA Brigade.  
His acquisition experience began as Sr. Military Software Analyst at NATO’s military headquarters in 
Mons, Belgium. He then served as the Associate Director, Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas. After attending Command and General Staff College, he served as the Chief 
of Information Technology, Acquisition Career Management, within the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army for Acquisition Logistics and Technology. He was then selected as a 
Congressional Fellow and served as a legislative assistant to a Member of Congress. After 
completing the fellowship, General Williamson served as the Product Manager for the Global 
Command and Control System-Army, and then as the Acquisition Military Assistant to the Secretary 
of the Army. He served as Commander of Software Engineering Center-Belvoir (SEC-B), He was 
then assigned as the Project Manager, Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team) Network 
Systems’ Integration within Program Manager, Future Combat System (Brigade Combat Team). He 
then served as the Director of Systems Integration, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Acquisition Logistics and Technology. Prior to his current assignment, General Williamson 
served as the Deputy Program Manager, Program Executive Office, Integration.  
General Williamson's awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters; 
the Meritorious Service Medal with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters; the Joint Service Commendation medal, the 
Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Joint Service Achievement Medal, the 
Army Achievement Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Army Superior Unit Award, the National 
Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star, the Global War on Terrorism Service Ribbon, the Army 
Service Ribbon, the Overseas Ribbon and the Army Staff Identification Badge.  
General Williamson’s education includes a Bachelor of Science from Husson College in Business 
Administration, a Masters of Science in Systems Management from the Naval Postgraduate School 
and a PhD in Business Administration from Madison University. He also has graduate certificates in 
Public Policy from the JFK School of Government, Harvard University and the Government Affairs 
Institute at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff 
College, a graduate of the Advanced Management Program at the Harvard Business School and was 
a Senior Service College Fellow at the University of Texas at Austin. He is Level III certified in 
Program Management and Communications and Computers. 
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previously a Director of Health Outcomes at RTI-Health Solutions, RTI International. Her research 
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assessment, and bio terrorism. She has published in numerous journals. Dr. Richter is a member of 
the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) and the 
International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). She has published 
in several peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of the American Medical Association, Journal 
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Managed Care Interfaces. Although English is Dr. Richter's first language, she is also fluent in 
German and French. She joined the NPS faculty in August 2003. [arichter@nps.edu] 
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Abstract 
This study extends previous research by the authors that focuses on the growing 
global challenge of affordability.  Ballooning public debt burdens are forcing countries 
around the world to rethink their approaches to procurement decisions.  This paper 
offers a new approach to government vendor selection decisions in major public 
procurements. A key challenge is for government purchasing agents to select 
vendors that deliver the best combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic 
funding levels.  The mechanism proposed in this paper is a three-stage, 
multiattribute, sealed-bid procurement auction.  It extends traditional price-only 
auctions to one in which competition takes place exclusively over attribute bundles.  
The model reveals benefits in public procurements by defining an alternative in terms 
of its value to the buyer over a range of possible expenditures, rather than as a 
single point in budget-value space.  This approach leads to some interesting results.  
In particular, it suggests that in a fiscally constrained environment, the traditional 
approach of eliminating dominated alternatives could lead to sub-optimal decisions.  
The final extension of the model explicitly examines the buyer’s decision problem 
under budget uncertainty. The result is in a new metric proposed to evaluate 
vendors: an expected utility measure of performance. 
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This study focuses on the growing global challenge of affordability.  Ballooning public 
debt is forcing countries around the world to rethink their procurement strategies.  Recent 
congressional testimony urges the DoD to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that 
are affordable” (Written testimony of M. Sullivan , 2009).  In the absence of profits to guide 
public procurement decisions, the challenge is to select vendors that deliver the best 
possible combination of desired non-price attributes at realistic funding levels.  The public 
procurement mechanism proposed in this paper is a multiattribute sealed-bid procurement 
auction with multiple budgets. 
The U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (2005) provided guidance in Subpart 14.5 
on a two-step procurement process for government agencies: 
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) 
discussion of a technical proposal.  No pricing is involved.  Step two involves the 
submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted acceptable technical 
proposals in step one.  Invitations for bids shall be issued only to those offerors 
submitting acceptable technical proposals in step one.  An objective is to permit 
the development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement 
of the Government’s requirements especially useful for complex items.  
Blondal (2006) discusses a similar two-stage1 bidding process, in which the procuring 
agency issues a general request and then later issues a detailed request based on the 
responses. 
Much of the multiattribute auction literature, including Che (1993), Beil and Wein 
(2003), and Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005), either implicitly or explicitly includes price 
alongside non-price attributes in the buyer’s value/utility function.2  While this standard 
approach is appropriate in many private-sector contexts, it generates complications in public 
procurements such as major defense acquisitions.  Unlike the private sector, where the 
incentive to maximize profits provides a clear objective, the best government decision-
makers can do is to maximize value to the public subject to funding (budget) constraints. 
In an application that maximizes value subject to a budget constraint, Michael and 
Becker (1973) make the case that costs be excluded from measures of value.  The authors’ 
focus is on performance and affordability.  Vendors compete for a government contract 
based on their relative costs of producing different components of quality and their unique 
(sunk) technology investments that define their ability to offer different tradeoffs among 
these components.  A similar approach is known as “cost as an independent variable” 
(CAIV).  Larsen (2007) offers the following explanation of CAIV: 
                                                
1 Blondal defined stage differently than we do in this paper.  We use the term to refer to a decision or set of 
decisions that depends only on exogenously given parameters and previous decisions.  For example, Blondal 
considers a government agency’s offer and the vendor responses to be a single stage, whereas we treat these 
as two distinct stages.  Using our interpretation, Blondal’s model is, in fact, a five-stage process. 
2 Value functions are often referred to in defense procurement as measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  The term 
MOE is used in a few different ways.  It may describe an attribute itself, a single-attribute value function, or a 
multiattribute value function, which might incorporate the whole objective’s hierarchy, or only a portion of it.  For a 
detailed discussion of MOEs, see Sproles (2000).  Regardless, this paper emphasizes using an MOE that 
includes exclusively non-price attributes. 
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All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, 
performance and schedule.  Under CAIV, performance and schedule are 
considered a function of cost.  Cost and affordability should be a driving force, 
not an output after potential solutions are established. (p. 15) 
Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discuss a Value Added Analysis approach for 
applying multiattribute preferences to optimize the United States Army’s force structure 
under a budget constraint, in accordance with the CAIV concept.  The scope of our model 
differs from theirs, in that we focus on a single acquisition program.  This allows us to 
incorporate vendors’ decision-making into the model, along with issues of asymmetric 
information.  In our model, as in theirs, prices and costs do not appear in the buyer’s value 
function.  Instead, the buyer provides information about possible budget levels, allowing 
prices to appear in affordability constraints in the spirit of CAIV. 
Budget constraints may not be known when the vendor selection decision is made.  
Buede and Bresnick (1999) describe the acquisition process as having four major phases 
and point out that vendor selection occurs in the first phase, while the budget may change 
throughout the entire process.  Two pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean 
(1967), advocate determining the maximum effectiveness for a given budget and then 
examining how each alternative fares under several different budget scenarios.  Quade 
(1989) also advocates evaluating vendor proposals based on a range of possible budgets.  
This leads to the generation of what we call an “expansion path” for each vendor, which 
shows how the vendor’s proposals change as the budget increases or decreases and thus 
provides a more complete view of the vendor’s ability to provide performance.  Our model 
allows the buyer to offer a set of possible budget levels and solicit vendor proposals for each 
one, leading to the generation of expansion paths. 
Expansion paths reveal valuable information to government procurement agents. 
Suffering from asymmetric information, buyers have very limited knowledge of the vendors’ 
costs of producing a particular attribute, as well as the technologies (production functions) 
that combine those attributes into products under consideration.  Parkes and Kalagnanam 
(2005) describe the vendors’ private information: “Seller costs can be expected to depend 
on [the] local manufacturing base and sellers can be expected to be well informed about the 
cost of (upstream) raw materials” (p. 437).  The general motivation for constructing the 
expansion paths is expressed succinctly by Keeney (2004): “If you do not have the right 
problem, objectives, alternatives, list of uncertainties, and measures to indicate the degree 
to which the objectives are achieved, almost any analysis will be worthless” (p. 200).  It is 
imperative in public procurement for alternatives to be adequately described and for any 
budget uncertainty to be explicitly acknowledged.  We emphasize that this can be carried 
out using a value-focused thinking approach, as discussed by Keeney (1992) and by Parnell 
(2007) in the context of national defense.  That is, it is important for the buyer’s evaluation 
process to be carried out independent of the particular alternatives offered. 
In the Model section, we introduce our proposal for a three-stage procurement 
model. This multiattribute sealed-bid procurement auction emphasizes the use of a value 
function with exclusively non-price attributes and the specification of a set of possible budget 
levels.  We formulate the decision problems faced by the buyer and the vendors, and 
discuss various insights derived from the model.  We also provide two historical examples of 
government procurement decisions that likely could have benefited from a more complete 
formulation of alternatives and specification of uncertainties. 
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After vendor bids have been solicited for a spectrum of possible budget levels, the 
Budget Uncertainty section expands the formulation of the buyer’s problem to explicitly 
include the buyer’s beliefs of the probability associated with various budget levels.  We 
follow a decision under uncertainty approach as introduced by Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer 
(1964).  In addition to expressing their beliefs about various budget levels as probabilities, 
the government buyer specifies a utility function over the value of attribute bundles that 
incorporates his or her risk attitude, as discussed by Dyer and Sarin (1982) and Matheson 
and Abbas (2005).  The result is a new metric proposed to evaluate vendors: an expected 
utility measure of performance. 
Model 
The procurement agency (the buyer) begins by specifying a multiattribute value 
function over a set of desired attributes A = {a1, …, an}, as well as a set of (increasing) 
possible budget levels B = {b1, …, bk}.  There are m vendors, each of whom will respond in 
the second stage with a bid.  A bid consists of a set of attribute levels that can be produced 
by a vendor for each of the k possible budget levels.  Vendor j’s bid can be expressed as k 
vectors of the form ( )1 , ,j j njA a a= K  for 1, ,j m= K , where ija  is the level of attribute i 
offered by vendor j.  Note that unlike bids in most multiattribute auctions, Aj does not include 
any information about price.  Instead, the price is captured in the multiple possible budget 
constraints.  The buyer’s ultimate decision (the third stage) is to select a vendor 
{ }1, ,j m∈ K .  The buyer’s preferences over the attributes are represented by a value 
function ( )jV A .  The same value function is used for all possible realized budget levels. 
For ease of exposition, we assume ( )jV A  is an additive multiattribute value function 
similar to that discussed by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997), although it is 
later demonstrated the conclusions of the paper do not require ( )jV A  to be additive.  The 
use of additive multiattribute value functions requires the assumption of mutual preferential 
independence (Dyer & Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood & Sarin, 1980).  This implies that alternatives 
can be compared exclusively on the set of attributes over which they differ, ignoring levels of 
other attributes.  
For any given budget level, the buyer’s objective is as follows: 
max
j  
( ) ( )
1
n
j i i ij
i
V A w v a
=
= ∑
,     (1) 
where iw  is the weight the buyer places on attribute i: 0≤ iw ≤1, and iw∑ =1, and ( )i ijv a  is 
the buyer’s single-attribute value function for attribute i.  We assume that vi(aij) is scaled 
such that the minimum achievable value is zero and the maximum achievable value is one.  
Note that since ( )jV A  is a weighted average of terms between zero and one, it also ranges 
from zero to one.  We assume the buyer has an understanding of the range of attribute 
levels in determining the weights and that the buyer explicitly shares the weights and the 
single-attribute value functions.  It is necessary for the government buyer to completely 
specify its preferences to the vendors by providing wi and vi(aij) for i = 1, …, n.  The final 
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stage of the model involves applying Equation 1 to the set of vendor bids and the buyer 
selecting the vendor that yields the highest value. 
Given the buyer-determined set of desired attributes A, along with the weights and 
single-attribute value functions, and the set of possible budget levels B, each vendor 
produces an attribute bundle to submit to the buyer for each of the k possible budget 
constraints.  Since vendors have private information about their own production capabilities, 
costs, and profit requirements, each vendor forms his or her own private beliefs about the 
likelihood of a bid being accepted.3  We assume that all vendors believe the probability of a 
bid being accepted is increasing in ( )jV A  for all possible budget levels. 
The problem faced by a representative vendor j for an arbitrary budget level b can be 
expressed as follows: 
max
ija
 ( ) ( )
1
n
j ij i ij
i
V A w v a
=
= ∑ , 1, ,i n= K  
    
subject to  ( ) ( )( )1 , ,j i j n njC v a v a b≤K ,    (2) 
where Cj is the total cost paid by firm j (with the desired profit margin included) to produce a 
set of single-attribute values.  The cost incurred to generate the corresponding attribute 
bundle cannot exceed b.  We assume that Cj is increasing in iv  for all i and that Cj is strictly 
convex.  This condition is not overly restrictive, since it simply implies decreasing returns 
from vendor investments to improve any individual attribute value.  Because the objective 
function in Equation 2 is linear, given the assumed properties of a representative vendor’s 
cost function, a unique solution (vendor proposal) will exist. 
For purposes of illustration, and ease of exposition, the remainder of this study 
focuses on two vendors and two (non-price) attributes.  The two vendors can have different 
technologies with which to combine the two attributes and may face different costs to 
improve individual attributes.  The Lagrangian function to solve the vendor’s problem is 
given by the following: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2,j j j j j j jL w v a w v a b C v a v aλ= + − −  for j = 1,2. (3) 
Since an improvement in either attribute increases the value of a particular attribute bundle 




∂ ∂ > 0, each vendor will use the total available budget b to produce its 
attribute bundle proposal.  In this case, first order necessary conditions for an optimum are 
given by the following: 
                                                
3 For simplicity, we assume that each vendor determines its required profit margin for each possible budget level 
proposed by the buyer and that these fixed profit margins are incorporated into the attribute bundles offered.  We 
focus on the vendor’s decision of how to allocate fixed amounts of funding across the set of attributes to 
maximize the value provided to the buyer.  Although our results do not require any more details of vendor 
behavior , we believe this would be an interesting avenue for future research.  This exploration could be based 
on a vendor’s search for an optimum bidding strategy in a Dutch auction (see McAfee & McMillan, 1987, or 



















λ∂ = + =∂     (4b) 
( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2, 0j j j j
j
L
b C v a v aλ
∂ = − =∂ ,   (4c) 
where Equation4c simply asserts that the total budget is being used.  Solving Equations 4a 







= .     (5) 
This implies that the optimum strategy for each vendor is to choose a bid that uses 
the entire budget and for which the two attributes have equal ratios between the weight 
placed on the attribute by the buyer and the vendor’s marginal cost of increasing the value 
provided by that attribute.4  With two competing vendors, there will be two bids that can be 
represented by attribute bundles: ( )11 21,a a  and ( )12 22,a a . 
Of course, cost functions are likely to vary across vendors, meaning that the 
marginal costs in Equation 5 are likely to vary across vendors as well, resulting in a 
potentially diverse set of bids.  Multiattribute auctions allow vendors to differentiate 
themselves in the auction process and to bid on their competitive advantages (Wise and 
Morrison, 2000). 
With the buyer’s preferences and the vendor’s bidding strategy in place, we now 
demonstrate how a buyer can explore important differences between vendors.  Each vendor 
goes through the process described above for the k different budget estimates, each time 
producing a bid that satisfies Equation 5 for each of the k possible budgets.  This set of bids 
from a vendor constitutes an expansion path.  It tells the buyer precisely how a vendor’s bid 
will change as the budget constraint is relaxed (or tightened). For purposes of illustration, 
throughout the remainder of the paper, we use a set of six possible budget levels to simulate 
alternative possible funding constraints: ($5M, $10M, $15M, $20M, $25M, $30M) or simply 
(5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30). 
Consider the following functional form for the cost functions: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 21 1 2 2 1 2, j j j jv a v aj j j j jC v a v a e eβ βα α= + , 1 2 1 2, , , 0j j j jα α β β > for 1, 2j = . (6) 
This particular functional form is separable, in that it consists of the sum of cost 
functions on the individual attributes.  Each individual attribute cost function is increasing 
and convex, where the exponent ijβ  in Equation 6 determines the convexity of each 
                                                
4 Note that Equation 5 has a unique solution for each vendor when the entire budget is being used.  Because the 
cost function is strictly convex, as we move along the budget constraint curve, the marginal cost of improving one 
attribute’s value is increasing, and the marginal cost of improving the other attribute’s value is decreasing. 
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function.  Although the results of the study do not depend on this particular functional form, 
this offers a relatively simple way to illustrate our expansion path approach to government 
vendor selection decisions. 
Figure 1 offers an example of an expansion path.  The buyer in this example places 
a weight of 0.7 on Attribute 1 and 0.3 on Attribute 2.  The vendor represented in Figure 1, 
whom we will refer to as Vendor 1, faces lower marginal costs to improve Attribute 1 than to 
improve Attribute 2 at low levels.  Specifically, 














Figure 1. Expansion Path 
Note. This graph shows the expansion path for a vendor as the budget increases from 5 to 
30.  The markers of increasing size show the vendor’s attribute bundle proposals as the 
budget increases in increments of 5. 
Expansion paths will differ among vendors if the parameters of their cost functions 
( ,ij ijα β ) differ.  Consider a second vendor (Vendor 2), whose individual-attribute cost 
functions are more convex.  Specifically, 
12 22 12 221.5, 1.5, 2.7, 2.7α α β β= = = = .   (8) 
Vendor 2 is symmetric in the sense that he or she does not specialize in providing a 
particular attribute.  Any asymmetry in Vendor 2’s expansion path is due to the buyer having 
asymmetric preferences over the two attributes. 
Applying the parameters in Equations 7 and 8 results in the expansion paths shown 
in Figure 2.  The two piecewise linear expansion paths, one for each vendor, are based on 
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the six possible budget levels.5  They illustrate optimum combinations of attribute values that 











0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
v 2
v1





Figure 2. Expansion Paths—Differing Cost Functions 
Note. This graph shows the expansion paths for two vendors with differing cost functions as 
the budget increases from 5 to 30.  The markers of increasing size show each vendor’s 
attribute bundle proposals as the budget increases in increments of 5. 
Figure 2 reveals an interesting dynamic, which relates to one of the key insights of 
this study.  Under optimistic assumptions about future budgets, it is clear that Vendor 1 will 
be preferred and selected as the winner. At relatively high budgets, Vendor 1 dominates 
Vendor 2.  However, the reverse is true under a more pessimistic budget.    Under severe 
budget constraints (e.g., $5 million), it is clear that Vendor 2 will be preferred and selected 
as the winner.  If a government buyer believes a significant budget cut is possible then 
selecting a dominant alternative under the optimistic budget scenario (Vendor 1) may be 
misleading. The dominated alternative (Vendor 2) should not be prematurely eliminated 
since it may, in fact, end up being the preferred vendor. 
                                                
5 Fitting a curve to the points might also be a reasonable approach.  We use a piecewise linear form because we 
specifically would like every attribute bundle in the vendor’s bid to fall on the expansion path because we believe 
this makes the method more transparent.  We would advise the analyst and the buyer to use their discretion on 
which approach to take, based on the particular context of the auction. 
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To illustrate this new expansion path approach more clearly, we compute ( )jV A  for 
each of the twelve attribute pairs shown in Figure 2.  The two vendors’ bids can then be 
plotted as curves in “budget-value” (or cost-effectiveness) space, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Value by Budget Level 
Note. This graph shows the value provided by each vendor’s bid for various budget levels. 
Related to the expansion paths, the bids illustrated in Figure 3 are piecewise linear 
curves.  We can think of each one as a function expressing the value to the buyer of the 
attribute bundles each vendor will provide over the range of possible budget levels.  We will 
write this function for vendor j as Ωj(b), defined for all possible budget levels b. 
The dynamic revealed in Figure 2 is illustrated more clearly in Figure 3.  It is 
apparent from Figure 3 that Vendor 2 dominates the competition for any positive budget 
below the switch-point, b < b’, while Vendor 1 dominates for any budget above the switch-
point, b > b’.  As Quade (1989) also discusses, this observation suggests rethinking the 
simpler definition of dominance, which refers to points (not functions) in cost-effectiveness 
space. 
Viewing alternatives as functions in budget-value space reveals that the point-based 
definition can be misleading.  A static comparison that begins by assuming a relatively high 
fixed budget would eliminate Vendor 2 from further consideration.  For example, consider 
offers from Vendor 1 and Vendor 2 based on optimistic budgets above b’.  A technique that 
focuses on points and not functions would eliminate Vendor 2; yet, Figure 3 indicates that 
eliminating Vendor 2 prematurely could lead to a less desirable outcome if subsequent 
budget cuts resulted in an actual budget somewhere in the range of 0 < b < b’.  This 








This switch-point phenomenon occurs as a result of differences in the two vendors’ 
expansion paths.  There is nothing unique about the particular functions chosen in our 
example.  The same results can be obtained in many different ways, including with non-
additive forms of the buyer’s value function.  In fact, non-linear interactions between 
attributes are likely to magnify this effect.6 
While the approach in this paper involves assessing the expansion paths by soliciting 
vendors’ attribute bundle offers for multiple budgets, it may be possible for a government 
buyer to obtain similar information by soliciting price bids for multiple sets of performance 
requirements (i.e., specified attribute levels).  This would have the advantage of not 
requiring the buyer to reveal a value function, but also the corresponding disadvantage of 
not allowing each vendor the flexibility to achieve the desired values with the least costly 
combinations of attribute levels.  Using either approach, the buyer benefits by being able to 
incorporate affordability into the decision in a meaningful way when the budget is not known 
with certainty.  In particular, the buyer gains the ability to view each alternative as a function 
in cost-effectiveness space, rather than as a single point. 
Selecting a vendor based on points in cost-effectiveness space can lead to worse 
outcomes than expected, since there may be uncertainties present that are implicitly 
ignored.  One example is the $8.8 billion U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) 
contract, which was awarded to Electronic Data System (EDS) in 2000.  Wilson (2006) 
explains that EDS was the lowest bidder and that problems arose due to the scope of EDS’ 
task being much larger than expected by either party.  Whether another vendor might have 
performed better than EDS given the expanded scope is unknown.  (See Jordan, 2007, for 
more information on NMCI.) 
A second example is the U.S. Air Force’s acquisition of the Boeing (then McDonnell 
Douglas) C-17 Globemaster III.  This aircraft, commonly referred to as the C-17, is used as 
an airlifter for troops and cargo.  McDonnell Douglas’ C-17 proposal was selected in 1981, 
effectively ending the bidding process.  However, a dollar amount was not specified until 
1986, when the Air Force awarded McDonnell Douglas a $3.39 billion contract.  Even after 
1986, the C-17 program was subjected to a great deal of change.  Kennedy (1999) explains 
the following: 
In addition, how much airlift was required for war plans was largely undefined. 
Securing necessary funding for the C-17 was simply an ordeal. That the 
program’s funding fell victim to the budget axes wielded by Congress, DoD, and 
Air Force undermined the ultimate goal—timely operational delivery of the C-17. 
As in the NMCI example, it would have been very difficult to foresee the eventual outcome 
for the C-17 based simply on a cost-effectiveness point when the decision was made. 
The sensitivity of vendor selection decisions to different funding scenarios is a 
fundamental result that arises in a wide variety of government procurement contexts and 
places a premium on affordability.  In a constrained fiscal environment, we strongly 
recommend the adoption of an expansion path approach to guide government vendor 
selection decisions. 
                                                
6 For example, consider a multiplicative value function and suppose that one vendor has to incur a large cost to 
increase the value from 0 to 0.1 for one particular attribute.  This vendor will offer bids of little value for low 
budgets but, depending on cost functions, may offer very attractive bids for higher budgets. 
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A natural extension of the model is to consider a procurement auction in which the 
buyer assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible budgets.  If the buyer 
believes that the realized budget will be b with probability p(b) or, in the continuous case, 
that b has a probability density function f(b) then the government vendor selection problem 
can be examined using a decision under uncertainty approach. 
This adds a valuable new layer to the problem: We must now include the buyer’s risk 
attitude, because he or she will be evaluating gambles over multiple possible values.  We 
express risk attitudes through a utility function U, which takes the overall multiattribute value 
measure as its argument (see Dyer & Sarin, 1982, or Matheson & Abbas, 2005, for details).  
This approach allows us to separate the buyer’s attitude toward risk and their strength of 
preferences over the attributes. 
Given a value function V and maximum and minimum achievable values, U can be 
assessed using simple binary gambles.  For example, the buyer could specify an attribute 
bundle a0 that provides the minimum value (zero) and an attribute bundle a* that provides 
the maximum value (one) and then consider a hypothetical gamble in which he or she 
receives a* with probability p and a0 with probability 1-p.  For any other attribute bundle a’, 
U(V(a’)) would simply be the value of p for which the buyer is indifferent between receiving 
the uncertain gamble and a certain value, a’. 
The government buyer’s new problem is to select a vendor j to maximize 
( ) ( )( )j
b
p b U bΩ∑ ,     (9) 
or, in the continuous case, to maximize 
( ) ( )( )jf b U b dbΩ∫ .     (10) 
That is, the government buyer maximizes the expected utility provided by the vendor, 
incorporating both the strength of its preferences over the vendor’s attribute bundle 
proposals, expressed by Ωj, and its risk attitude, expressed by U. 
Consider both the buyer and vendors’ information used to generate Figure 2.  Recall 
that the buyer places weights of 0.7 and 0.3 on Attributes 1 and 2, respectively, while 
individual vendor production and cost characteristics are given by the parameters in 






−= − .     (11) 
where, as previously specified, V varies between zero and one over the possible attribute 
bundles.  The function and parameters given by Equation 11 represent a decision-maker 
who is risk averse.  Note that since the minimum value of V is zero and the maximum is one, 
U(V) also varies between zero and one.  Figure 4 illustrates the values and corresponding 
                                                
7 We chose the exponential function because it has constant absolute risk aversion, measured by a risk 
tolerance parameter (in this case, 0.5), making its assessment reasonably straightforward and understandable.  
It is commonly used in decisions under uncertainty, but the analysis could certainly be carried out using a 
different class of utility function if desired. 
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utilities to the buyer of each vendor’s attribute bundle proposals under the six possible 

















Figure 4. Bid Utilities 
Note. This graph shows the buyer’s utility function and the value and corresponding utility 
offered by each vendor for the six budget scenarios in the decision under uncertainty 
example. 
Consider a scenario in which the buyer believes that b1, …, b6 will occur with 
probabilities 0.1, 0.15, 0.35, 0.25, 0.1, and 0.05, respectively.  Given these probabilities for 
the six budget levels and this particular buyer’s preferences, the expected utility if Vendor 1 
is selected is 0.771, as opposed to 0.800 if Vendor 2 is selected.  While this aggregate 
result suggests that our buyer should select Vendor 2, disaggregating the vendor selection 
problem offers additional insights. 
The bundle of attributes provided by Vendor 1 would be more desirable for budget 
levels 15, 20, 25, and 30, one of which is likely to occur with a probability of 0.75.  However, 
in the case of a very low budget, Vendor 1’s attribute bundle would be far less desirable.  
Yet, the expected values of the two bids are nearly identical.  Such insights would be nearly 
impossible to obtain when presented with only a single bid from each vendor for the most 
likely budget, b = 15.  More revealing and robust analysis is only feasible if the buyer solicits 
bids from the vendors over multiple possible budget levels.   
Constructing a gamble over possible overall values is extremely difficult if a vendor’s 
bid consists of only one attribute bundle for a single budget, rather than a set of attribute 
bundles for multiple budgets.  A decision under uncertainty approach requires decision-
makers to place a value on all possible outcomes.  The procurement auction framework 
advocated in this paper ensures that these outcomes are fully specified. 
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This paper offers a new approach to government vendor selection decisions in major 
public procurements. The paper describes a simple three-stage, multiattribute procurement 
process for government vendor selection decisions.  It allows the buyer to incorporate the 
government’s preferences over multiple attributes, and it allows each vendor to offer its best 
possible bid based on the budget estimate for the program and on each vendor’s cost 
structure.  The model operationalizes a version of the popular concept of cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV).  The results of this study reveal the importance in the public 
sector of including costs as part of a budget constraint, rather than incorporating costs 
directly in the buyer’s value and utility function.   
The model developed in this paper allows vendors to submit bids for a range of 
possible budget levels.  This leads to the generation of an expansion path for each vendor, 
which illustrates how each vendor’s bid improves as budgets increase.  Most importantly, it 
is demonstrated that a vendor whose bid is dominated at one particular budget level can 
easily end up being the winner at another budget level.  This makes it vital for procurement 
agencies to rethink traditional public sector bid solicitations.  Instead of viewing each vendor 
as a single point in cost-effectiveness space, it is important for governments to view each 
vendor as a curve in budget-value space.  In economies where affordability is a priority and 
where budgets are likely to change over time, the approach proposed in this paper can 
result in better choices for voters and taxpayers since it ensures vendors are not 
prematurely eliminated from consideration. 
Finally, since precise funding levels may not be known with certainty when vendor 
selection decisions are made, we explicitly model vendor selection as a decision under 
uncertainty.  In this case, the buyer assigns a probability distribution over all possible 
budgets (funding levels) while a utility function captures the buyer’s attitude toward risk.  
This methodology enables buyers to generate expected utilities from vendor proposals, 
providing a valuable new approach and metric for government vendor selection decisions. 
The approach in this paper can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction 
mechanism for a buyer when a range of budget authorities for the program can be estimated 
and products are differentiated and complex.  The approach combines the competitive 
advantages of auctions with the flexibility of decisions based on multiple attributes of a 
product, all while incorporating considerations of affordability when the budget level is not 
known with certainty. 
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